THE INVESTIGATIVE JUDGE AND HIS POWERS

Abstract

This paper examines the legal and institutional significance of the Presidential Decree No. PF-89 (DP-89) dated 10 June 2024, which introduces the investigative judge as a new subject of criminal procedure from 1 January 2025 and strengthens judicial control at the pre-trial stage. The reform redistributes key decision-making powers regarding procedural sanctions (including detention/house arrest, searches, interception of communications, seizure of property) and certain coercive measures, thereby expanding the scope of independent judicial oversight over investigative and operational-search activities. Particular attention is given to guarantees of impartiality and due process: the decree emphasizes the investigative judge’s independence and prohibits assigning non-justice-related tasks, while also establishing that pre-trial procedural sanctions authorized by the investigative judge are reviewed exclusively by the appellate instance in a single-judge composition. In the administrative dimension, the reform is linked to jurisdictional rules under Article 245 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility, which provides for the consideration of specified administrative offence cases by the investigative judge of a district (city) criminal court. Overall, the introduction of the investigative judge is assessed as a structural safeguard aimed at enhancing rights protection, strengthening evidentiary scrutiny, and reducing risks associated with combining pre-trial coercive decisions and subsequent adjudication within the same judicial function.