THE STATE’S POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN ENSURING THE RIGHT TO LIFE
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Modern American Journals
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This article analyzes the state’s positive and negative obligations in ensuring the right to life from a constitutional law perspective. The essence of the right to life as a natural and inalienable right is examined, emphasizing that it is not limited to mere biological existence but is closely connected with human dignity and the concept of a life worthy of human beings. The study explores doctrinal debates surrounding the “narrow” and “broad” interpretations of the right to life and demonstrates that treating these approaches as mutually exclusive is both scientifically and practically ineffective. The author proposes a three-layered model of the right to life, comprising the prohibition of unlawful deprivation of life, the state’s active duty to protect life, and social conditions that, while not constituting the core of the right, may be necessary for its effective realization in certain cases. Based on an analysis of international legal instruments and leading scholarly views, the article concludes that the right to life is a complex right that requires the state not only to refrain from interference but also to take active and effective measures to protect human life in practice.