THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN COMMON LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

dc.contributor.authorUmarova Kholiskhon Nomoz kizi
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-27T20:32:03Z
dc.date.issued2026-01-27
dc.description.abstractThe concept of the modern corporation governed by a board of directors emerged within the framework of the common law legal tradition that developed after the Anglo-Saxon period. At that historical stage, corporate entities in the form understood today did not yet exist within the Anglo-Saxon legal order. Nevertheless, the contemporary understanding of corporate directors can be traced back to the early notion of a trustee or trusted representative operating in that period.
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dc.identifier.urihttps://usajournals.org/index.php/4/article/view/1875
dc.identifier.urihttps://asianeducationindex.com/handle/123456789/112711
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherModern American Journals
dc.relationhttps://usajournals.org/index.php/4/article/view/1875/1962
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.sourceModern American Journal of Business, Economics, and Entrepreneurship; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2026); 188-195
dc.subjectCorporate governance, fiduciary duties, common law legal system, board of directors, duty of loyalty, duty of care, duty of disclosure, conflict of interest.
dc.titleTHEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN COMMON LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typePeer-reviewed Article

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